Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Alternative?

IP² Working Paper No. 13003
by Pierre Larouche, Jorge Padilla, and Richard S. Taffet

Original Date: October 29, 2013
Published at Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Keywords: arbitration, courts, final-offer arbitration, FRAND royalties, IPRs, hold up, patent disputes, SEPs, SSOs and standardization

ABSTRACT:

This paper reviews the recent proposal that SSOs amend their IPR policies to require SEP owners and willing licensees to resolve disputes over licensing terms, particularly FRAND royalty rates, using mandatory, binding baseball-style (or “final offer”) arbitration. We first consider the fundamental underlying premise of the arbitration proposal - namely, that there are systemic problems relating to FRAND-based standardization and that current disputes are not being efficiently addressed. We find that mandatory baseball arbitration is a solution in search of a problem, will not necessarily afford “better” outcomes, and is more likely to lead to decisions that undermine the standardization process.

PDF Downloads:
COMPLETE PAPER: Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Alternative?
ABSTRACT: Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Alternative?

SSRN Link:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346892